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Beyond the War:  
Nazi Propaganda Aims in Spain during the Second World Wari 
 
In 1938, a dark, small and apparently inoffensive Austrian national of Armenian origin, 
Hans Josef Lazar, following Ribbentrop’s orders, arrived in Spain as representative of 
the Transocean news agency. Shortly thereafter, he became press attaché for the 
German Embassy in Madrid and confidant to ambassador Stohrer. Within a few months, 
he and the ambassador managed to get rid of the Sonderstab Köhn, the propaganda team 
that Goebbels had sent to Spain during the civil war, and take charge of all propaganda 
operations in the country. ii  The wide network of interests and contacts both with 
German and Spanish authorities Lazar built ensured that he would continue as the main 
architect of German propaganda campaigns in Spain throughout the Second World War. 
Even amid the power struggles between Ribbentrop and Goebbels and between the 
parallel channels and the ambassadors, as well as the Axis defeat, Lazar managed to 
survive – both figuratively and literally. In 1945, after striking a deal with the Spanish 
government, his name conveniently disappeared from the list of Nazi officials that the 
Allies pretended to extract from Spain in order to denazify it.iii  
Historiography concerning the dissemination of Nazi propaganda in Spain during this 
time all points to Lazar as the man behind the curtain. However, when it comes to 
analysing the propaganda that was being disseminated, all studies limit themselves to 
investigating the propaganda networks or the propagandistic service of the Falangists to 
the Reich. iv  Moreover, they do not really enquire about the objectives of said 
propaganda, which are always treated as secondary. This could be explained by the fact 
that most studies dealing with German-Spanish relations during the Second World War 
have usually centred around Spain’s potential entry into the war. Even though a 
considerable number of studies have pointed to the usefulness of Spanish neutrality to 
Nazi Germany, the debate about when, how and why Spain could have entered the war 
remains under the spotlight. Study and analysis of the Nazi propaganda campaigns in 
Spain, however, highlight how the objectives pursued by German propaganda went 
beyond bringing Spain into the conflict. Depending on the course of the Second World 
War and the needs of the Reich, propaganda campaigns varied in means, content and 
dissemination. These changes reflect, to an extent, the different objectives of German 
foreign policy regarding Spain, from trying to provoke its entry into the conflict to 
strengthening the ideological, economic and cultural links between both countries and 
guaranteeing Spain’s support for the German war effort, to counteracting Allied 
influence on the peninsula and aiming at turning Spain into a bridgehead for German 
interests in North Africa and Latin America. In the end, the stories of both Lazar and 
Nazi propaganda in Spain are stories of opportunism and survival.  
 
Had the gamble Hitler played in order to harmonise French and Spanish interests been 
fruitful, the year 1940 might have been the year that the Axis powers managed to bring 
Spain completely over to the Reich. In the end, however, preventing the French 
colonies’ defection to the Allies eliminated the possibility of a belligerent Spain.v In 
fact, Franco’s imperial dreams cooled off as the negotiations progressed throughout the 
year and, by January 1941, when the question re-emerged, the Spanish government 
position turned evasive. Ribbentrop’s reaction was to order Stohrer to maintain a cold 
and distant position throughout the year.vi After that there would be little to no chance to 
move on the Iberian Peninsula,vii and Ribbentrop decided to support – for the most part 
– a policy of neutrality in Spain. However, even afterwards, when Germany’s strategy 
had mostly pivoted to the Eastern front, Germany did not halt its vast investments of 
men and resources into Spain. In fact, by 1941 the German embassy in Spain was the 
largest in the Reich and, by 1942, 432 people worked directly for Lazar.viii While it is 
true that even between 1941 and January 1943, the so-called parallel channels kept 
trying to provoke Spain’s entry into the war, these were mostly members of the NSDAP 
pursuing their own agenda in Madrid and bypassing – or working against – the 
ambassador while keeping contact with Ribbentrop through Erich Gardemann. The 
parallel channels’ activities, the optimistic – and not very realistic – reports they sent to 
Berlin and the success of Operation Torch made Ribbentrop’s support of a neutral Spain 
waver. The minister even considered a shift in policy. However, the parallel channels’ 
power play failed and Ribbentrop completely re-embraced his policy of neutrality in 
February 1942, which was confirmed by the signing of the Spanish-German Secret 
Protocol. Hitler and Ribbentrop actively accepted that a neutral Spain was a better bet 
than a belligerent one.ix  
As several studies show, Spain’s usefulness to the Reich was not limited to its potential 
participation in the war. We could mention the provision of raw materials, cooperation 
between the Spanish and German police or the establishment of complex espionage 
networks across the Peninsula as further proof of this reality.x In matters of propaganda, 
both this investment of resources and the effort to influence Spain’s public opinion 
continued. According to Peter Longerich, Lazar managed to build the most effective 
propaganda apparatus that Germany had abroad and was the press attaché who received 
the most detailed instructions from the press department of the German Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, especially until late 1941.xi In fact, it was throughout 1942 and 1943 when 
Lazar and Stohrer developed their most important propaganda campaign, the Große 
Plan. By then, the potential entry of Spain into the war was out of the question.  
Things might have looked different had the parallel channels taken over propaganda 
operations, but the fact is that the people in charge of propaganda during this period, 
Eberhard von Stohrer and Hans Lazar, had no interest in bringing Spain into the war. 
Stohrer thought that Spain would be counterproductive as a belligerent and was more 
useful to the course of the conflict as a neutral party. Consequently, he opposed the 
numerous plots by the parallel channels and worked hard to protect that neutrality.xii 
Lazar, who, despite not being a member of the NSDAP, would prove to be very loyal to 
the ambassador and those who came after him, complained bitterly about the activities 
by the Sonderstab Köhn, the propaganda team that Joseph Goebbels had sent to Spain 
during the Spanish Civil War partially to compete with the Wilhelmstrasse in 
propaganda matters. According to the press attaché, their dirty work, which aimed at 
bringing Spain into the war at all costs, did nothing but cause unrest and isolate the 
ambassador.xiii Stoher and Lazar’s style fitted better with a more traditional image of 
politics and diplomacy. More than bringing Spain into conflict, they focused on 
working towards the stabilisation of Franco’s regime, and ensuring its constant 
assistance in the war effort. In order to do that, Stohrer managed to dissolve the 
Sonderstab and place Lazar as head of all propaganda activities.xiv 
Since his arrival in 1938, Lazar expanded his network of contacts, establishing a strong 
relationship with high officials in the Spanish government, the Falange, and the editors 
of the major newspapers. His ability to establish connections with key players in the 
government had already proved useful during his stay in Romania, where he had 
worked for the Austrian government, before offering his services to the Germans on the 
eve of the Anschluss.xv However, he also owed his success to strong German-Spanish 
cultural relations and the connections between the NSDAP and the Falange, both of 
which were becoming ever closer.xvi The fact that the Spanish Civil War had served an 
important role in Nazi anti-Bolshevik campaigns and had seen an increase in 
propaganda activity on the peninsula helped as well. xvii  By 1934, the Deutsches 
Nachrichtenbüro (DNB) had signed an agreement with the Spanish news agency 
Fabra,xviii which paved the way for a more important agreement. When, in November 
1938, the rebel government created the national news agency EFE, it decided to use the 
DNB and Stefani as main sources of information, showing clear adherence to the Axis. 
Such a strong dependency was heightened because its two correspondents, José Antonio 
Giménez Arnau and Ramón Garriga, ardent pro-Axis Falangists, were established in 
Rome and Berlin. Additionally, some Spanish journalists who worked in Berlin during 
the Second World War had served in the Sonderstab Köhn.xix Lazar built upon these 
contacts and managed to broker a deal with the newspapers ABC, Informaciones, 
Madrid and Vanguardia in order to allow Spanish correspondents in Berlin to send their 
articles and opinion pieces directly to the Spanish press through the EFE, which 
guaranteed the German embassy considerable control over media coverage of the war 
and in some cases prevented Spanish censorship.xx Meanwhile, the embassy made use 
of two minor Spanish news agencies, Arco and Faro, to disseminate articles and opinion 
pieces to provincial newspapers and created the Berliner Briefe, which provided articles 
to fifty newspapers, who were unaware that the articles came from the embassy.xxi 
Moreover, Lazar met daily with the editors of the main Madrid newspapers and 
established very close friendships with prominent Falangists, particularly those linked 
to the press department, such as general press officer Enrique Giménez Arnau, general 
propaganda officer Dionisio Ridruejo and José María Alfaro, whose appointment as 
undersecretary of press and propaganda was celebrated at the press attaché’s apartment 
in Salamanca.xxii 
Between 1939 and 1941, Lazar ensured that the Spanish press provided a vision of the 
war that was clearly favourable to Germany and aimed at fostering mistrust toward 
Great Britain. Thanks to him, even some newspapers previously critical of Germany 
shifted their views.xxiii However, the press attaché’s social skills eventually came to be 
combined with bribery. Out of his monthly budget of 200,000 pesetas for the purpose of 
buying advertising space for German companies, 175,000 were used to bribe Spanish 
journalists and publishers. xxiv  Lazar’s friendship with prominent Falangists made it 
possible for German authorities to occasionally censor publications on the international 
situation issued by the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.xxv  
Nazi propaganda during the Second World War focused on two core messages. First, 
presenting German foreign policies as proportional reactions to the mistreatment of 
Germany, epitomised by the Treaty of Versailles, showing that even though Germany 
had not started the war, it would win, and not just because of its military and economic 
strength, but also because its cause was just. Secondly, exploiting and increasing anti-
British sentiment, capitalising on the experiences and propagandistic leitmotifs of the 
First World War, which in turn transformed Germany into a protector of neutral parties. 
The first message was unoriginal and common to other propaganda campaigns; 
however, conveying it involved certain difficulties, which demonstrates the limits of 
propaganda even in friendly nations. The second message, which showed strong 
continuity with Germany’s First World War propaganda, would prove very effective in 
a country already predisposed against Britain, a sentiment rooted in a historical imperial 
rivalry and stoked by Francoist rhetoric and the experience of the Spanish Civil War.  
Lazar was able to spread these messages widely by inserting articles in the Spanish 
press and broadly distributing two specific publications: ASPA, a weekly bulletin 
created by Goebbels’ propagandists that had proved its effectiveness during the Spanish 
Civil War, and the official bulletin for political information issued by the embassy and 
addressed to the Spanish authorities, which, thanks to Lazar and the Francoist 
government, was disseminated to a larger audience, while the British one had much 
fewer readers.xxvi The bulletins, which appeared three times a week with a circulation of 
45,000 to 60,000,xxvii made an effort to justify German actions, especially the attack on 
Poland. Following the same arguments Nazi propaganda had been using since May 
1939, xxviii  they attempted to prove that Poland had been persecuting its German 
minority, in turn criminalising the nations that had crafted the Versailles Treaty. This 
propaganda framed the repatriation policies established by the Polish government as a 
clear de-germanisation policy, part of an extermination campaign against the German 
minority that resulted in 58,000 deaths, and was the product of a ‘twenty-year orgy of 
violations and destruction’. xxix  However, it was not easy to convince Spain of the 
righteousness of an attack on a friendly, catholic country. Franco’s government ordered 
journalists to refrain from making damaging references to Poland, a friendly and anti-
Bolshevik nation, always without endangering the friendship with Germany. Lazar 
acknowledged that his fight against this attitude produced only mixed results.xxx It was 
equally difficult to handle the coverage of the Russo-Finnish War in the press. In 
January 1940, Fiedhelm Burbach, consul-general in Bilbao, reported on the harsh critics 
of the Soviet Union and recommended ignoring the issue so as to not provoke critics of 
the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. However, following Ribbentrop’s orders, the press office 
managed to blame the Allies for the Finnish situation with some success, making this 
conflict proof of the modernity and value of totalitarianism.xxxi  
More interesting were the constant references to British imperialism. Through 1940 and 
1941, following orders from Paul Karl Schmidt, chief of the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
Press Office, the embassy focused on spreading the image of the greedy British Empire 
who, worried only about protecting its world power, preferred to fight its wars far from 
home, not caring if that meant endangering neutrals. Schmidt ordered that Chamberlain 
and Churchill’s speeches be manipulated to convey the idea that they were merely 
portraying neutrals as victims in order to breach their neutrality and open new theatres 
of war, where they could have better chances and fewer risks in defeating Germany. 
The information bulletins disseminated the same ideas, but highlighted aspects of trade, 
using navicerts as definitive proof of Britain’s anti-neutral attitude.xxxii In April 1940, 
Stohrer reported on the success of these tactics. In fact, in subsequent months the 
Spanish press became violently anti-British while maintaining a neutral attitude toward 
France.xxxiii 
It is clear that Nazi propaganda during this period aimed at bringing Spain closer to the 
Axis powers, but not at bringing it into the war. In fact, Gibraltar featured only twice in 
the information bulletins, once in March 1940 and another as a passing mention on the 
occasion of the Spanish occupation of Tangier. Furthermore, it did not feature as a topic 
of interest in the correspondence between the press office in Madrid and the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry in Berlin. On the contrary, propaganda activities show clear continuity 
with one of the main objectives already pursued during the Spanish Civil War: cutting 
off and preventing further influence from Great Britain and France over Spain.xxxiv An 
objective that, in turn, contributed to strengthened economic relations between Germany 
and Spain, thus taking advantage of Spanish neutrality, which was what Stohrer 
pursued.  
Things would get complicated in 1941. In February, after Franco postponed entry into 
the war indefinitely, the Spanish government forbade its citizens from holding positions 
of power in foreign press agencies, as well as from acting as foreign correspondents for 
Spain while working for a non-Spanish entity.xxxv In practice, the order did not curtail 
the activities of those already working for Germany, but it did highlight the change in 
the attitude and pragmatism of the Francoist regime. On top of it all, 1941 registered a 
spike in Allied propaganda, which prompted Stohrer and Lazar to devise their largest 
propaganda campaign yet, the Große Plan. Stohrer’s experience in propaganda – he had 
already been in charge of propaganda in Spain during the First World Warxxxvi – and 
Lazar’s skills combined to create an extensive programme whose success depended on 
the support of the Spanish government and the Falange’s commitment. The good 
relations established by these two men with key members of the government and the 
Falange’s self-serving interest for all things German presented the German embassy 
with a unique opportunity.  
Approved in January 1942, the plan sought to counteract enemy propaganda by 
intercepting it and disseminating pro-Nazi black and grey propaganda.xxxvii Appearing 
as anonymous or independent publications, none of the materials distributed by this 
campaign revealed their true origin, although in some cases they suggested a Falangist 
origin. In fact, the plan relied heavily on the Falange’s cooperation, as both the 
interception and the dissemination of new pamphlets and materials were in the hands of 
this organisation.xxxviii The plan differed greatly from previous campaigns, as it was 
‘purely Spanish’, devised from the Spanish position, taking into account Spanish 
thoughts and arguments and counting on collaboration and resources from the Spanish 
people. The plan was put in motion through private and state organisations and it 
targeted and specified different audiences, from old Falangists, to Catholics and 
Carlists. More importantly, the plan had the support of Spanish Foreign Minister Ramón 
Serrano Suñer and, by mid-1942, had Franco’s direct approval. However, Franco also 
told Stohrer, who tried to convince him of a potential British coup against the regime, 
that he was painting too black a picture since the only effective British propaganda was 
pro-Catholic. Nevertheless, with a budget of 150,000 pesetas against the alleged 6 
million the British embassy invested in propaganda, the ambassador managed to set up 
an apparatus that could distribute from 2 million leaflets per month and up to 10 million 
if necessary. This depended on cooperation from the Dirección General de Seguridad, 
and thousands of covert volunteers, mostly Falangists and veterans from the Spanish 
Civil War and the Blue Division.xxxix A tight budget could go a long way when counting 
on the power of a receptive state. 
The Große Plan was more than black propaganda; it was the epitome of a symbiotic 
relationship between the Falange and the German embassy, a close collaboration that 
benefitted both parties. For Germany, this meant an extensive propaganda apparatus that 
disseminated messages specifically targeted to the Spanish audience and that would 
attempt to keep the country free from Allied influence and economically and culturally 
integrated into the New Order.xl For the Falange, it meant an attempt to capitalise on 
their German connections and experience to pursue its own agenda, to consolidate and, 
if possible, extend the party’s influence over Spanish domestic politics.xli  
From more traditional tactics, such as using news agencies and including opinion pieces 
in the press, to designing crossword puzzles, comic strips and religious leaflets, the plan 
aimed to influence Spain’s view of the war, fostering viral anti-Bolshevism, 
encouraging anti-British sentiment and focusing on the certainty of German victory. 
The attack on the Soviet Union, which allowed for the re-emergence of those anti-
Bolshevik arguments that, although temporarily discarded at the beginning of the 
conflict, had worked so well during the civil war, xlii  made the propagandists’ task 
slightly easier. Counter-propaganda, however, was at the core of the Große Plan. 
During 1942, the embassy published 56 different information sheets, of which they 
circulated 9 million copies.xliii Many focused on counteracting one of the most effective 
arguments of Allied propaganda, that of the anti-Christian character of National-
Socialism. Leaflets like The Pope and the caudillos and rulers of Europe fight 
communism, Hitler: Arm of God or Spanish Catholic! Read and reflect, as well as 
newssheets like Catholic and Anti-Communist Newssheet and hundreds of parish 
leaflets which presented short, war-related comments inserted among the readings for 
the weekly mass, or the wide distribution of the papal encyclical against Communism, 
were good examples of it.xliv  
Religious propaganda was not new, as both the Allies and the Axis realised from very 
early on that in terms of propaganda, religion was one of the main battlefields in 
Francoist Spain. Therefore, this kind of propaganda had featured in German campaigns 
from the beginning.xlv However, the increase in Allied propaganda and the possibility of 
linking it, once again, to anti-Bolshevik leitmotifs made it even more prominent now. 
The plan focused as well on the use of irony, humour and entertainment to spread anti-
Allied sentiment. Crossword puzzles thematically connected to the course of the war, 
other publications like Humor de bolsillo (Pocket Humour) and illustrated fiction stories 
were widely distributed.xlvi Most of them aimed at making fun of Stalin, Churchill and 
Roosevelt, especially showing that Stalin could not be trusted (Figures 1 and 2). 
Additionally, the plan had an economic purpose, that of integrating Spain in the New 
Order. The embassy had begun to issue a brand new bulletin of economic information in 
early 1941. Throughout 1942, these bulletins, addressed to the Spanish authorities, 
increasingly mentioned the self-sufficiency of the European continent and highlighted 
how all occupied areas, from the Netherlands to Poland, were economically thriving 
under German rule.xlvii  
However, the collaborative character of the Große Plan and the appointment, in 
September 1942, of Francisco Gómez-Jordana as Foreign Affairs Minister sparked 
tensions between the latter and the Falange. Jordana’s appointment came to provoke a 
shift in Spanish foreign policy, which became more neutralist than ever before.xlviii That 
did not sit well with the General Secretary of the Falange, José Luis de Arrese y Magra. 
These tensions spiked in the aftermath of the signing of the Secret Protocol, which 
confirmed a new era in Spanish-German relations. The presence of the Allies in North 
Africa, developments in the Eastern Front, the signing of the Iberian Pact in 1942, and 
the Spanish economic needs, especially regarding supplies of oil and grain, which came 
to be entangled with German needs and Allied pressure, made Jordana’s neutralist 
policy a necessity, albeit a very tricky one to manage. This reality clashed with the 
Falangist belief in the Axis victory, a belief not only based on an ideological affinity, 
but in domestic necessity, as the Falange knew that an Axis victory was its best bet to 
increase its reach and power within the Francoist regime. In this context, Arrese also 
maintained a balancing policy. Extremely loyal to Franco, he accepted that the 
totalitarian discourse was no longer appropriate for the times, and applied gradual but 
important changes to official Falangist rhetoric. At the same time, although he did call 
for censorship – for the first time – of Axis publications,xlix he did little to rein in the 
Falangists’ pro-Axis views, which inevitably filtered into the media, which was 
controlled by the party. In fact, facing constant requests from Jordana, Arrese managed 
to protect the development of the collaborative campaign, constantly excusing the party 
and frequently criticising, or at least sowing doubts, about the ever-present complaints 
from the British and American embassies.l The Foreign Affairs minister, who was not in 
the loop about the Falangist-German character of the Große Plan, complained bitterly to 
Franco,li who, in a way very characteristic of him, did not censor Arrese for his attitude, 
nor did he lessen his support of Jordana.  
In 1943, United States ambassador Carlton J.H. Hayes complained to Jordana, because 
the police had made it very difficult for them to distribute their information bulletins, 
while German propaganda encountered no such difficulties. He even accused the 
Spanish press of Axis psychological warfare.lii In response, in addition to pressuring 
Arrese, Jordana tried to counteract Falangist actions by creating a new censorship 
department at the provincial level and by allowing for an increase in non-violent, pro-
Allied propaganda,liii but this did not put an end to the incidents. Falangists, especially 
from the student organisation (SEU) and the youth front, kept distributing pro-Axis 
propaganda and hindering the distribution of Allied propaganda, while Arrese kept 
deflecting, arguing that they were people posing as Falangists and trying to spark 
incidents, or stating that Falangists tend to distribute propaganda for both sides, 
depending on their personal preferences. liv  In one particular case, after the British 
embassy complained about the detention and torture of a number of people who had 
been caught reading the British bulletins, Arrese questioned the innocence of the 
victims and suggested that they might have been Communists, hiding their activities 
behind a feigned allegiance to Britain.lv This was not the only complaint about Falangist 
violent behaviour, which correlates with a spike in anti-British demonstrations between 
1943 and 1944.lvi These incidents confirmed the reach, tactics and strongly anti-British 
character of the Große Plan.  
Replacing Eberhard von Stohrer with Hans-Adolf von Moltke in early 1943 did not halt 
the campaign. On his arrival, the new ambassador gaped at the size of the healthy and 
very active embassy in Madrid. With more than 500 people officially working for the 
embassy, not everyone could fit into the building for his first reception as ambassador. 
It is no wonder that he came to describe the embassy as ‘a hydra with many heads’. lvii 
More concerned with the activities of the parallel channels and with continuing 
Stohrer’s overall policy, Moltke did not interfere with the propaganda campaigns. His 
replacement by Dieckhoff later in the year did not halt the Große Plan. Thanks to the 
FET’s support and financial help from I.G. Farben, Lazar managed to keep it active 
until 1944.lviii That year, the arrival of José Félix de Lequerica to the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and the development of the conflict consolidated the policy established by his 
predecessor. By September, Lequerica ordered the elimination of any pro-Axis 
sentiment in the press.lix There was no space for German propaganda in Spain anymore.  
But the objectives of German propaganda in Spain were not limited to halting the Allied 
influence on the peninsula, integrating Spain in the New Order or ensuring continued 
Spanish cooperation in economic and espionage-related matters. The country also had 
potential as a bridgehead to influence other areas, particularly North Africa and Latin 
America. In the first case, the occupation of Tangier by Spanish forces in 1940 provided 
Germany with a golden opportunity to set up a centre for espionage and propaganda in 
Morocco, aimed not only at tracing Allied activities in the area, but also at fostering and 
financing anticolonial movements. The German presence in Tangier became noticeable 
very early on. The Spanish authorities made an effort to hinder the dissemination of 
British propaganda and delay the censorship of their publications, while pro-Axis and 
Spanish publications encountered no such obstacles. Additionally, they placed speakers 
in every city in the Spanish protectorate, which broadcast Falangist and German 
propaganda. lx   Germany even proposed the development of a joint propaganda 
campaign, a plan that was delayed by Juan Beigbeder.lxi German propaganda published 
in Arabic, aimed at convincing Moroccans of their military superiority and at exploiting 
anticolonial sentiments, which on more than one occasion meant criticising Spanish 
imperialism.lxii This did not sit well with Luis Orgaz, high commissioner in Morocco 
since May 1941, whose strong nationalism and dislike for the Falange made him 
particularly wary of these activities. He did, eventually, agree to them as long as they 
did not imply the dissemination of propaganda among the natives that could be 
considered harmful to Spain. To ensure this, he invited Lazar visit the Protectorate and 
receive some personal orientation in this regard.lxiii However, clashes with the German 
authorities would lead to Orgaz’s dismissal in April 1942. 
The problem was that Morocco, and especially Tangier, was an area overcrowded by 
propagandists from both sides. lxiv Besides, the Axis defeat in Tunisia in May 1943 
brought the German military effort in North Africa to an end. This, however, did not 
halt the dissemination of propaganda or other activities of German agents based in 
Tangier, which continued until the closure of the German consulate in May 1944.lxv  
But it was the transformation of Spain into a bridgehead to influence Latin America that 
symbolised perfectly the opportunistic and pragmatic character of German propaganda 
in the country. This concern with Latin America was not new, already during the First  
World War Germany had aimed at exploiting the cultural links to Spain and ideas of 
Hispanidad to counteract the influence of the United States and guarantee Latin 
American neutrality. The intensification of cultural and trade relations confirmed that 
Spain could be used as a bridgehead to further influence Central and South America 
after the conflict, and eventually crystallised in the creation of the Ibero-American 
Institute in Berlin in 1929. lxvi During the interwar period, the institute continued this 
policy, particularly under Wilhelm Faupel, who pursued his own policies, especially in 
connection to the Falange, regardless of what the German embassy in Spain was 
attempting to achieve.lxvii Faupel led the institute between 1934 and 1945, except for the 
time he served as ambassador to Spain during the civil war.  
However, this interest for Latin America was not exclusive to the Ibero-American 
Institute, other organisations pursued similar policies. In February 1939, the Deutscher 
Fichte-Bund, an anti-communist organisation founded in 1914 but clearly connected to 
the Nazi Party, proposed an agreement to the Spanish single party. They wanted the 
Falange’s foreign section to disseminate their propaganda in Latin America.lxviii There is 
no confirmation that the Falange agreed, but we know that, thanks to Lazar’s skilful  
intervention, the Falange regularly reproduced articles from the embassy’s bulletins in 
their publications for Latin America during the Second World War.lxix In fact, according 
to Ramón Garriga, one of Lazar’s first missions on his arrival in Spain as a 
correspondent for Transocean was to establish a radio station in Spain that served to 
broadcast all agency news to Latin America.lxx As will be explained shortly, Lazar’s 
initial failure was not the death knell of the project.  
The initial directives showed strong continuity not only with initial propaganda 
campaigns during the Spanish Civil War, but most notably with First World War 
policies, persuading Spain to take point in protecting Latin American neutrality and 
highlighting that any United States advancement in the area would damage Spain’s 
interests and prestige. lxxi But Spain’s situation in the Second World War was quite 
different from that of the First World War. The country’s position within the strategic 
and economic planning of the European war added another dimension to the 
propaganda campaigns. On his arrival, Ambassador von Moltke, for example, was quick 
to notice how events that took place in South America, particularly the breakdown of 
relations with Chile, could endanger the German position on the peninsula. lxxii 
Throughout the conflict, Paul Schmidt also made a habit of indicating which articles 
should also be circulated to Latin America, but also which Latin American events 
should be subject to polemic in the Spanish press. Moreover, both Stohrer and Lazar 
mentioned in their correspondence how delicate it was to push certain items related to 
Latin America, as it was important not to interfere with Spanish interests in the region. 
The situation became even more complex when Spain became dependent on the United 
States for oil, which prompted Lazar to dissuade Berlin from pursuing the publication of 
certain news in the Spanish press in order to protect oil shipments.lxxiii In parallel, the 
Falangist and cultural policy pursued by the Spanish government in the area, especially 
through the creation of the Hispanic Council in 1940, could be both an asset and a 
liability to German propaganda objectives. That year, a high point in the imperialist 
aspirations of the Falange, Schmidt asked to restrain the imperialist tone of the Falangist 
newspaper Pueblo, not to cause mistrust in Latin America.lxxiv Rejecting Spain could 
easily give way to rejecting the Axis and a closer alliance with the United States. 
This situation made it hard to strike a balance between influencing the Hispanic world 
and preventing a clash between Spanish and German interests that could harm both 
countries’ relations with Latin America. Still, German propagandists managed to 
develop widespread campaigns based on close monitoring of the Latin American and 
Spanish press, in order to keep the region out of the war and far from the economic and 
strategic reach of the US. In this sense, knowing as he did that news published in the 
embassy’s bulletins made its way to Latin America through the Falange and the Spanish 
news agency Arco, lxxv Lazar used the new economic bulletin as a key tool in this 
campaign. This publication constantly mentioned the exploitative and imperialistic 
character of US policies in the region, pointing out how US weakness could only be 
partially alleviated by looting raw materials from Latin American countries. Tungsten, 
aluminium, chromium and silver were raw materials that, because of the Japanese 
advance, could only be provided by these countries. The bulletins also talked about how 
this economic dependency on the US would destroy Hispanic culture in Latin 
America.lxxvi  
Furthermore, two events came to provide Schmidt and Lazar an excellent opportunity to 
prove their point. The first one happened in Bolivia, where an alleged Nazi coup was 
discovered in the summer of 1941. The key piece of evidence of the thwarted coup was 
a letter from Major Elías Belmonte, the Bolivian military attaché in Berlin, to the 
German ambassador in La Paz, Ernst Wendler. Although the letter had been fabricated 
by the British intelligence service, apparently unbeknownst to the US government, it 
served its purpose, namely eradicating all pro-Axis influence in the country, bringing 
Bolivia closer the US economically and eventually culminating in a declaration of war 
in April 1943.lxxvii The publication by the Spanish media of a press release confirming 
the official version of events by the Bolivian government provoked an intense 
correspondence between Schmidt and the German embassy in Madrid. He wanted not 
only for Lazar to protest to the Spanish authorities, but to portray the Belmonte case as a 
US attack on Latin American sovereignty and as an example of their ‘Jewish criminal 
gangster methods’. However, it was not so easy to leak these ideas to the press, with the 
exception of a few newspapers, notably Informaciones, whose editor had been at the 
service of the German embassy since before the Spanish Civil War. Other newspapers 
ignored the event or limited themselves to publishing the German press release in 
response to the one published by the Bolivian government without comment.lxxviii It was 
easier to manage coverage of the ousting of the president of Panama, Arnulfo Arias, in a 
coup d’état backed by the US government.lxxix This as well as other anti-US messages 
filtered quite easily into the Spanish press. 
The Hispanic Council became another piece on the chessboard. The council, created to 
help Spain achieve a relevant position within the New Order, sought to draw Latin 
American countries closer and neutralise US influence in the region. However, the 
imperialist character of the institution was not lost on the Latin American press. 
Newspapers in Argentina, Mexico and Guatemala commented on it. For some it was a 
mere adaptation of the Consejo de Indias to the realities of the 20th Century, for others it 
was the advance party of Nazi imperialism. lxxx  However, the council was not an 
instrument in the hands of the Axis, but rather a key piece of Spanish foreign policy, 
especially now that the Francoist authorities were increasingly worried about the growth 
of Pan-Americanism, which in their mind threatened to erase the remnants of the 
Spanish culture in Latin America. lxxxi  Nazi propaganda stoked these fears, while 
denying that Germany had any military interests in America, a message frequently 
spread by Allied propaganda. Roosevelt’s declarations about the existence of a secret 
German map which would prove the Nazis’ global aims and the threat to the American 
continent, caused concern in the Reich. Paul Schmidt strongly denied all points made by 
the US president, and ordered Lazar to ensure this denial featured clearly in the press, 
which he did. lxxxii  Furthermore, German interest in Latin American neutrality had 
become noticeable right after the US entered the conflict, when Ribbentrop became 
receptive to the possibility of Spain leading a neutral block alongside Chile and other 
nations. The plan did not work, as most countries, except Chile and Argentina, decided 
to align themselves with the US in January 1942.lxxxiii Later on, under the auspices of 
Jordana and foreign policy director José María Doussinague, the Hispanic Council 
pursued a neutralist policy, focused on the dissemination of cultural catholic 
propaganda and the estrangement from the Axis, especially after mid-1943.lxxxiv 
The last propaganda project that attempted to leverage the cultural traction Spain had in 
Latin America was the establishment of a radio station on the peninsula that, although 
ostensibly Spanish, would serve German interests. Even though early attempts by Lazar 
to ensure Spain’s cooperation in this matter failed, his efforts came to fruition during 
Ramón Serrano Suñer’s trip to Berlin in 1940. During the visit, Antonio Tovar, 
undersecretary for press and propaganda, and EFE director Vicente Gállego met with 
Paul Schmidt. In the event that Transocean could no longer function in America, 
Schmidt wanted the EFE to disseminate Nazi propaganda and news in the region, 
without revealing, of course, the origin of such information. As the EFE director 
refused, Lazar continued negotiations with Serrano and Tovar, which resulted in the 
Schmidt-Tovar agreement in June 1941. lxxxv The Schmidt-Tovar agreement entailed, 
among other things, the installation of an EFE broadcasting station on the Spanish 
border paid for by the German government.  
Interestingly, this was not the first project of this kind that Schmidt ran on the Iberian 
Peninsula. Another broadcasting station, under the name Radio Mondial, operated from 
Lisbon. Portuguese in origin, it was soon put to the service of German propaganda, 
managing to operate from several European capitals, including Madrid. The station, 
Schmidt’s personal project, was a model of what German propagandists wanted to 
achieve in Spain. Intended to counteract the advances of Allied propaganda, Radio 
Mondial specialised in broadcasting news in a clearly neutralist tone, so as to not raise 
suspicions and thus guarantee their influence over neutral countries and non-
combatants. This tactic did not do them much good, as the project came to be 
discovered not only by the Propaganda Ministry, who had not been informed, but by 
almost everyone in the Allied camp and the Portuguese government. By September 
1941 it was an open secret that Radio Mondial was no more than a covert propaganda 
operation by the Reich. On top of that, the rivalry between the Ministries of Propaganda 
and Foreign Affairs prompted Goebbels to push for the station’s closure, alleging their 
contacts with England as a motive. The station eventually ceased all operations in 
March 1942, but only because the Portuguese government had revoked its licence.lxxxvi   
The Schmidt-Tovar agreement fitted, therefore, into Paul Schmidt’s broader strategy 
regarding the use of radio abroad. But it also fitted within the imperialist Falangist 
agenda. As early as 1938, the Falange had started developing propaganda campaigns 
with the intention of uniting the Latin American nations under Spanish leadership. To 
achieve this, they wanted to launch a unified campaign, which would be coordinated 
from Havana, Buenos Aires and Lima.lxxxvii The project shared the spirit that drove the 
creation of the Hispanic Council, but was more openly imperialistic. The failure of the 
project explains why the Falange was so eager to support the Schmidt-Tovar agreement, 
whose fulfilment would allow them to reactivate and develop the project via their 
collaboration with Germany.   
The Schmidt-Tovar agreement was a very good example of close Nazi-Falangist 
collaboration. The selection and dissemination of any propaganda materials via the new 
broadcasting station, which was supposed to stress neutralist and international aspects, 
would be managed by a joint commission formed by Falangist and Nazi officials, and 
would be partly financed by Germany. The agreement would also provide Germany 
with all relevant information about developments in Latin America. However, the 
project did not have the support of a key player, EFE director Vicente Gállego.lxxxviii 
Gállego was closer to the hierarchy and organisations of the Catholic Church than to 
Falange.lxxxix Not in vain, he had been a close collaborator of Ángel Herrera Oria, with 
whom he had worked in the editorial department of El Debate, and the editor-in-chief of 
another newspaper, Ya, characterised by the Press Office of the German embassy as 
clerical.xc Wary of both the Germans and opposing pressures from the Falange, he 
purposely slowed down the process, preventing the agreement from being fully applied. 
By the end of 1941, and under pressure, he had only approved four of the thirty EFE 
correspondents suggested by Lazar, even though Serrano had approved the list 
personally. All of them were exclusively paid by the EFE, in an attempt by Gállego to 
contain any German influence. Interestingly enough, one of them was the correspondent 
assigned to the US. Little good would this do them as the US government had already 
been informed about the project, at a time when everyone already suspected that 
Portugal’s Radio Mondial was nothing more than a covert Reich operation. In the end, 
despite the Falange having laid off Gállego with Arrese’s support because of the 
former’s opposition to Lazar and the FET’s plans as well as his allegiance to pro-Allied 
Foreign Affairs Minister Francisco Gómez-Jordana, the agreement was not fulfilled.xci 
This does not mean, however, that the EFE or the Spanish radio broadcasts had no hand 
in spreading news that came directly from Germany or favoured German interests. The 
dismissal of Gállego in January 1943 allowed the Falange to bypass Foreign Affairs 
censorship and take control of the news that made its way to the agency. Once again, 
the Falange’s support, more specifically Arrese and the Vicesecretaría de Educación 
Popular – the organism in control of all press and propaganda matters – was key. When 
German activities in South America were halted at the beginning of 1942, the EFE 
served as a conduit for news items.xcii Moreover, well into 1943, Jordana was still 
reproaching the party’s Secretary General, José Luis de Arrese, over the pro-Axis 
orientation of the party’s press, which was contrary to his directives.xciii 
But nothing could hide the fact the tides of war were changing. When, in 1943, 
Germany tried to proceed with the installation of the broadcasting station, Jordana’s 
campaign to limit Lazar’s and Falange’s pro-Axis activities escalated, and Franco’s 
faith in a complete German victory began to waver, which alongside Spain’s economic 
needs allowed for improved relations with the Allies. Jordana claimed the agreement 
had been signed without his knowledge, and only when Lazar showed him his own 
copy was Franco brought into the loop. The dictator said that such an agreement had 
been made without his consent and ordered to return the broadcasting material to 
Germany.xciv It is doubtful that Franco was ignorant of these projects, considering that 
just a year earlier he had given his approval to the Falange’s collaboration in the Großes 
Plan. In any case, his refusal was a confirmation of a shift in foreign policy that had 
already started with Jordana’s appointment in September 1942.  
Nevertheless, Lazar managed to find a solution. At the same time that he was 
negotiating the signing of the Schmidt-Tovar agreement, he established contact with 
Enrique Meneses, a Spanish national working in Paris who, following the fall of France, 
decided to offer his services to Germany. He owned a news agency, Prensa Mundial, 
which had originally been used to disseminate French propaganda to Latin American 
countries. In 1941, Prensa Mundial began to disseminate Nazi propaganda in the region 
and eventually even provided Germany with the long-awaited broadcasting station.xcv 
Moreover, the agency seemed to be not an alternative to the Schmidt-Tovar agreement, 
but a loophole for fulfilling it. Even though it was originally owned and led by Enrique 
Meneses, its management changed in 1942, when Gregorio Marañón y Moya took 
charge, a position he retained until 1944. He maintained close contact with Juan 
Bellveser, who managed the offices in Paris and led the reorganisation of the agency in 
November 1943, when its ownership was transferred from Enrique Meneses, by then 
living in Estoril, to Saro and Rodríguez Acosta. Additionally, the agency counted on the 
collaboration of renowned Spanish writers such as Azorín, Carlos Sentís, Rafael 
Sánchez Mazas and Álvaro Cunqueiro and sent news to the peninsula as well, where 
they were properly supervised and, if need be, censored by Lazar.xcvi The support and 
protection of the agency by the Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular,xcvii and more 
clearly the direct involvement in the project of Marañón y Moya, who had been head of 
Secretaría Política of the General Secretariat of the Falange between 1940 and 1941, 
confirms yet another close collaboration in terms of propaganda between the Falange 
and Lazar. In fact, in July 1943, Jordana noted how broadcasts to Latin America 
controlled by the SEU would portray international events in the exact same way as 
Prensa Mundial. xcviii  Not even the new censorship measures taken by the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry were sufficient to curb the Falange’s pro-Axis enthusiasm.xcix  
Given Lazar’s skill at managing propaganda campaigns, it is not surprising that Hitler 
came to describe the Spanish press as the best in the world.c Years later, when writing 
his memoirs, Lazar would try to tone down his contributions during the war by jokingly 
reflecting on how he should have tried to make the Spanish press less pro-German.ci 
However, not even the most skilled propagandist could counteract the hard realities of 
the front and the conflict’s trajectory. The shift in Spanish politics established by 
Jordana found, albeit slowly, its counterpart in the Spanish media. This new attitude that 
provoked confusion among the Falangists, as the complaints of one local leader of the 
single party reflected: ‘[I don’t know] if I should bust the heads of all those new 
Anglophiles, if I should incarcerate them at the mere provocation, or if, on the contrary, 
I should shake hands with them and turn into one of them’.cii 
The Axis defeat put an end to a history of cooperation between the Falange and Lazar, 
but this did not mean the end of either. The Falange, conveniently steered by Secretary 
General José Luis de Arrese, came to accept that it was time to take a backseat and 
ensure its own survival within the regime in a world where the New Order was no 
longer a possibility. Regarding Lazar, the wide network of contacts among Spanish 
elites he had established came to be very convenient when the Allied authorities came 
knocking at his door. In the end, alongside other prominent officials, he gained 
protection from the Spanish government. Doussinague guaranteed this protection in 
exchange for Lazar destroying his copy of the Schmidt-Tovar agreement.ciii  
As we have seen, with skilful leadership by Lazar and the decisive support and 
assistance of the Falange, German propaganda in Spain served a varied set of aims, 
defined by many different considerations and circumstances. These could be 
summarised as follows: preventing Britain and France from expanding their influence 
on the peninsula, guaranteeing Spanish assistance to the war effort – which implied its 
economic and cultural integration within the New Order – and using the country as a 
bridgehead to further influence other regions, particularly North Africa and Latin 
America. Some of these aims presented clear continuities with Germany’s pre-Second 
World War foreign policy, but they also developed within a framework marked by the 
interaction of three elements: an ideological affinity with Franco’s regime, particularly 
with the Falange; the practice, first by Stohrer, and later by other ambassadors, of 
realpolitik that, as opposed to the parallel channels, looked kindly on Spain’s neutrality 
and fearfully on her belligerency; and finally, opportunism, of which Lazar’s 
accomplishments would be the clearest example. The Stohrer-Lazar tandem managed to 
navigate these circumstances, taking advantage of the Falange’s ideological affinity and 
interests when needed and adapting – sometimes even toning down – their propaganda 
so as to benefit the Falange’s agenda and Germany’s economic, strategic and 
propagandistic needs. The combination of ideology and opportunism, which had already 
characterised German intervention in the Spanish Civil War,civ conveniently balanced 
by the ambassadors’ realpolitik allowed for fruitful collaboration with the Falange. This 
in turn highlights how Spanish-German relations overall in this period should be 
considered within this same framework.  
Nazi Germany looked for Spanish allegiance but that allegiance did not necessarily 
have to take the form of full belligerency; Spain’s neutrality was also useful to the 
German war effort. Moreover, although multiple historians have shown how this 
situation allowed for fruitful economic exchanges, extended espionage networks and the 
refuelling of German submarines, the study of propaganda suggests that we might need 
to look more closely at the ramifications of Spanish neutrality, instead of focusing too 
much on Spain’s potential entry into the conflict, which might obscure the overall 
picture. By changing our perspective, it would be possible to further analyse how Spain 
fitted into the Nazis’ overarching foreign policy and evaluate whether this was the 
product of historical continuities with pre-war policies, opportunism or long-term 
planning.  
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